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WILLIAM L. VANDERBURGH
It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits.
—Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b24–25
1. Introduction
In Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles,1 the eminent philoso-
pher of science John Earman applies his considerable philosophical, technical, 
and rhetorical skills to “Of Miracles,” the famous tenth chapter of David 
Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and he concludes that it is 
deeply flawed:
“Of Miracles” is an abject failure. It is not simply that Hume’s essay does 
not achieve its goals, but that his goals are ambiguous and confused. 
Most of Hume’s considerations are unoriginal, warmed over versions of 
arguments that are found in the writings of his predecessors and contem-
poraries. And the parts of “Of Miracles” that set Hume apart do not stand 
up to scrutiny. Worse still, the essay reveals the weakness and the poverty 
of Hume’s own account of induction and probabilistic reasoning. And 
to cap it all off, the essay represents the kind of overreaching that gives 
philosophy a bad name. (Earman, 3)
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This is strong stuff. It is also, I think, almost entirely mistaken.2 In this paper I 
argue that Earman’s critique fails to hit home because he both misunderstands 
the aims and principles of Hume’s epistemology in general, and misconstrues the 
argument against miracles in particular. A key point against Earman, as Dorothy 
Coleman3 shows, is that Hume’s approach to evidential probability has an entirely 
different structure and basis than does the mathematical theory of probability 
Earman employs in his attack. Many other commentators on “Of Miracles”—both 
pro and con—have made a similar interpretive error.4
Since Earman and others get Hume’s argument against miracles wrong by 
making errors about key points of Hume’s epistemology, I begin by locating the 
argument against miracles within Hume’s philosophy generally. Next I dissect some 
of Earman’s errors, and ﬁnally I extend Coleman’s idea that Hume holds a non-
Pascalian theory of evidential probability by ﬁlling in some historical background 
and by providing the beginnings of a philosophical defense of that theory. The 
upshot is that although Hume’s argument against miracles may well be ﬂawed, it 
is certainly not an abject failure.
2. “Of Miracles”: Its Context and Main Contentions
“Of Miracles” was a lightening rod for debate in Hume’s own time and has never 
ceased to be one.5 Some version of the essay seems to have existed while Hume was 
composing his Treatise of Human Nature (ﬁrst published 1739–1740).6 Probably for 
fear of upsetting religious authorities, it was not included in the Treatise.7 Hume’s 
argument against miracles thus makes its debut in the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (ﬁrst published 1748). Its target is the argument that miracles provide 
grounds for accepting the truth of religious hypotheses.
The thesis Hume defends in “Of Miracles” is that reports of miracles are never 
adequate grounds for belief that a miracle has actually occurred; such reports are, 
thus, never adequate grounds on which to infer the truth of any particular religious 
hypothesis. This result depends in part on what Hume means by “miracle.” He 
gives two complementary deﬁnitions. The ﬁrst is: “a miracle is a violation of the 
laws of nature” (EHU 10.12; SBN 114). In a footnote to the same paragraph, Hume 
offers his second deﬁnition: “A miracle may be accurately deﬁned, a transgression 
of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some 
invisible agent” (EHU 10.12, n. 13; SBN 115, n.1).8
Clearly, a violation of a law of nature will authenticate some speciﬁc religious 
message if and only if it really does come about through the will of the deity pur-
portedly sponsoring the miracle. Whether or not the right sort of divine volition is 
present is a question fraught with its own skeptical difﬁculties, but it is a question 
that Hume can sidestep since according to his main argument we never have suf-
ﬁcient evidence for warranted belief that a law violation has occurred in the ﬁrst 
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place. This is why Hume’s argument has little to do with the second deﬁnition of 
“miracle,” and why critics who accuse Hume of leaning on the wrong deﬁnition 
have missed the point.
Hume is careful to distinguish “marvels” (the merely wonderful or unusual) 
from miracles (see EHU 10.8 and 10.11; SBN 113 and 114). Earman criticizes Hume’s 
distinction because it is not one made by Hume’s contemporaries: “what matters 
is not how Hume classiﬁed examples [of miracles versus marvels] but how the 
major participants in the eighteenth-century miracles debate classiﬁed them” 
(Earman, 11). But it is a common and well-accepted philosophical strategy to re-
ﬁne a deﬁnition in order to make it more precise, and then to draw philosophical 
conclusions from the redeﬁnition. For Hume’s purposes, only miracles conceived 
as law violations deserve the name, since only miracles in that sense could possi-
bly provide a special kind of evidence for religious hypotheses. Marvels and other 
events that happen conformably to the order of nature (events that can happen, 
without there being a law violation, though they might rarely or never actually 
occur) could be invoked in design arguments—Hume’s devastating critique of 
which occurs elsewhere.
Hume’s epistemology of empirical facts leads him to characterize laws of nature 
in such a way that it follows directly from the deﬁnition of a miracle as a violation 
of a law of nature that no report of a miracle should be believed. Hume divides 
all possible knowledge claims into two categories, matters of fact and relations of 
ideas (EHU 4.1; SBN 25). Relations of ideas are known with certainty; matters of 
fact, in contrast, can be known only to higher and lower degrees of probability, 
depending on the kind and strength of the evidence available. (See EHU sections 
2–6; SBN 17–59.) A law of nature is an empirical generalization formed on the 
basis of an observed constant conjunction of event types plus an expectation of 
the mind that future cases will resemble past cases. Note that since the activity of 
the human mind, in particular the role of customs or habits of thought is, Hume 
thinks, a crucial part of the story, for Hume laws of nature are epistemological 
rather than ontological categories.9
Even the best supported empirical generalizations are not known with cer-
tainty, but only with some degree of probability—they are constructed on the basis 
of inductive reasoning, which Hume famously shows to be non-demonstrative (see 
EHU 4, especially part 2; SBN 32–9). The appropriate degree of probability for a 
given empirical proposition is determined by the relevant available evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such 
conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the 
event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as 
a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds 
with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers 
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which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that 
side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he ﬁxes his 
judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All 
probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observa-
tions, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce 
a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. . . . In all cases, we 
must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and 
deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact 
force of the superior evidence. (EHU 10.4; SBN 110–11)
For Hume, the highest sort of knowledge we can have of empirical proposi-
tions is “moral certainty,” a degree of assurance sufﬁcient for action and belief but 
short of perfect certainty (EHU 4.18; SBN 35). Degrees of assurance with regard to 
empirical propositions vary along a scale of probabilities from “full proof” down 
through various lesser degrees of probability. (EHU 10.3–4; SBN 110–11 and EHU 
6, n.10; SBN 56.)
Mr. LOCKE divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In 
this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that 
the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to com-
mon use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and 
probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave 
no room for doubt or opposition. (EHU 6, n.10; see the similar comments 
at THN 1.3.11.2; SBN 124)
It is vital to recognize that when Hume writes of evidence that amounts to a 
“full proof,” he is not talking about demonstration. Demonstration is achievable 
only with regard to relations of ideas. Proof for Hume is a probabilistic category 
that applies only to matters of fact.10 Some commentators, including Earman, 
mistakenly suppose that when Hume concludes that the exceptionless experience 
on which laws of nature are based amounts to a “proof” against miracles, he means 
that the probability of the occurrence of a miracle is “ﬂatly zero” (see below). This 
is, however, to unjustly accuse Hume of committing a category mistake: whether 
or not a miracle has occurred is a matter of fact, so its non-occurrence cannot be 
logically necessary.11
Following the passage quoted above about proportioning belief to evidence, 
Hume makes the point that in ordinary life nothing is more important to judging 
the relative weight of evidence than evaluating testimony (EHU 10.5; SBN 111). 
Hume’s epistemology of testimony resembles John Locke’s. Locke12 argues that 
the credibility of testimony depends on several factors, chief among which is the 
conformity of the testimony with the rest of our experience. To someone from England, 
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testimony about a man walking on a frozen pond in December in England is 
in conformity with their own knowledge and experience, and the testimony is 
therefore to be judged credible by them. But (in the seventeenth century at least) 
to someone from the tropics, the same testimony is and should be much less cred-
ible: “[T]o a man . . . [who] has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted 
credit of a witness will scarce be able to ﬁnd belief” (Locke, 4.15.5.2, 656). Thus, a 
proposition’s degree of probability is determined in part by its epistemic context. 
Locke illustrates this with the story of the King of Siam’s response to the Dutch 
ambassador’s testimony that in northern countries water sometimes turns hard 
enough that an elephant could walk on it: “Hitherto I have believed the strange 
things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am 
sure you lie” (Locke, 4.15.5.2, 657). Hume repeats this story (with slight modiﬁca-
tions) to make a similar point (EHU 10.10; SBN 113–14).
For Locke there is a hierarchy of degrees of probability concerning matters of 
fact. Those cases in which we should have the highest degree of conﬁdence are 
those where the testimony of fair witnesses is consonant with our own constant 
experience and the experience of every person in every age (so far as we can tell). 
In such cases we have what Locke calls assurance, and we act as if the thing were 
certain, even though no matter of fact is truly certain. (Locke’s “assurance” cor-
responds to what Hume calls “full proof.”) We have a degree of probability Locke 
calls conﬁdence in those empirical propositions that, in our own experience and the 
experience of others, happen for the most part in a given way. Our assent is unavoid-
able with regard to events that may happen one way or another when there is no 
reason to doubt the witnesses. And so on. Hume concurs that “in our reasonings 
concerning matters of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from 
the highest [moral] certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence” (EHU 10.3; 
SBN, 110). But as Locke says,
The difﬁculty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and 
the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of 
nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and 
exactness is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the 
assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing: which rises 
and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common 
observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular 
instance, favour or contradict it. (Locke, 4.16.9, 663)
The connection between Locke’s epistemology of testimony and Hume’s ar-
gument against miracles is straightforward. A report of a miracle is a statement of 
the occurrence of a matter of fact of a special kind: the event, the miracle, is one 
that does not occur in the ordinary course of nature, nor (ipso facto) by natural 
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causes. Hume’s basic question is: Can there ever be sufﬁcient warrant for believing that 
a miracle in this sense has actually occurred? His answer is that, because of the nature 
of the case, there cannot ever be such warrant.13 No testimony is sufﬁcient to warrant 
belief that a miracle has actually occurred (EHU 10.12–13; SBN 114–16) because the 
experience on which a given law of nature is founded is extensive and exceptionless, 
but the testimony to a miracle is singular and can be wrong through mispercep-
tion, mistransmission, or deception. Thus, whenever a “wise” person weighs the 
evidence regarding any report of a miracle, she will judge the weight of evidence 
against the miracle to be (much) greater than the evidence for it.
The depth and breadth of the exceptionless regularity of past experience (“a 
ﬁrm and unalterable experience”) gives the strongest kind of warrant possible to 
the belief that the law will continue to hold in the future. It is not that the evidence 
demonstrates with certainty that the law is true, just that no empirical claim can 
possibly have stronger evidence than the evidence we have for those things we call 
laws of nature. The evidence offered in opposition to the exceptionless regularity 
is testimony. Testimony is normally reliable but is also fallible; it is known to be 
problematic when unusual events are being reported; and it is especially suspect 
in cases of reports of miracles because of the likelihood of deception or misper-
ception. Thus the weight of evidence derived from testimony about a purported 
exception to a law of nature in fact will never come close to the weight of evidence 
from experience that the law is indeed regular.
Hume says that humankind’s experience of the laws of nature is “ﬁrm, unalter-
able and uniform.” At least to many commentators, this seems to beg the question 
against experiences that observers take to involve exceptions to laws of nature. 
Fosl argues that “in fact [Hume’s] argument works just as well with weaker, more 
guarded claims. Indeed, an argument which relies only upon weaker (that is, more 
limited) premises is a stronger argument”:14 it would be enough to say that the 
evidence for the laws of nature is the strongest, most uniform evidence available, 
and that it establishes “paradigmatically ﬁrm” regularities of nature—our experi-
ence need not be exceptionless. If the evidence for laws is the paradigmatically best 
evidence we have, the evidence for a miracle can at best equal it, in which case the 
competing evidence (for and against the uniformity of the law in question) will 
balance off, which “must properly only lead us to the suspension of judgment on 
the issue.”15 In defense of Hume’s stronger claim, note that for the vast majority 
of laws of nature we do have exceptionless experience—the law of the solubility 
of sugar, for example, has never been violated.
The very exceptionlessness of regularities of past experience such as are em-
bodied in the law of gravity is what prompts the overwhelmingly strong impulse 
to believe in the future applicability of the law. A subsequent singular occurrence, 
positive or negative, affects one’s overall conﬁdence very little. Contrary to what 
some commentators have claimed, however, it is neither a consequence nor an 
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assumption of Hume’s position that one can never have a rational belief in a truly 
singular event, though he does think it extremely unlikely in fact that sufﬁcient 
evidence could be established. So long as the singular event in question does not 
appear to contradict any law of nature of which we are aware, one could potentially 
have a rational belief that it occurred. In such cases the degree of belief that results 
will depend for a “wise” person on the kind and strength of the available evidence. 
Also, some events that at ﬁrst seem contrary to nature will be found upon further 
investigation to be in conformity with laws that were previously unknown; once 
these new laws become known, it becomes rational to believe that those events 
occurred. All this is as it should be: The issue with regard to miracles is not what 
sorts of events are actual or possible, but rather what events it is rational to believe 
to be actual.
Hume’s imagined example of eight days of continual darkness about which 
there is agreeing testimony from learned observers and careful historians the 
world over (EHU 10.36; SBN 127–8) illustrates that Hume does not rule out the 
possibility of rational belief in the occurrence of singular events that appear to be 
contrary to the order of nature. Even there, though, Hume thinks that the correct 
approach will be to look for previously unknown laws or ordinary but unknown 
conditions that produced the event without there having been a violation of the 
laws of nature (a volcanic dust cloud, a rogue planet that passes through our solar 
system and temporarily blocks the Sun’s light, etc.).16 Hume is quite sure, moreover, 
that even if we had evidence sufﬁcient for rational belief in the occurrence of a 
truly singular event, we would nevertheless never (in fact) have sufﬁcient evidence 
for its supernatural origin. Thus, attempting to ground religious hypotheses in 
miracles will not succeed.
Earman’s example of the simultaneous cloud formations that spell out, “Be-
lieve in Emuh and you will have everlasting life,” over every nation of the Earth 
in the language of that nation (Earman, 11), is supposed to be an example of an 
extraordinary event that would (Earman thinks) give grounds for rational belief 
in the religious hypothesis written in the clouds. Of course, this event need not 
be a miracle. It might happen that the deity has arranged the laws and initial 
conditions of wind and weather in such a way that on a certain day the cloud 
formations in question come about naturally. In that case, there might be grounds 
for a design argument. Whether the design inference is adequately warranted will 
depend on the evidence that the event was not simply a freak of nature (a product 
of coincidence rather than design), or that it was not produced as an elaborate 
hoax (perpetrated, perhaps, by frat boys from outer space).
Hume concludes that given what we know, including facts about the reliability 
of human perception and testimony, in all past cases and likely in all future cases 
as well, the balance of evidence has led and will lead wise people to infer that 
any purported violation of the laws of nature is really an instance of deception, 
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misperception, or mistransmission. In order for testimony to justify belief that a 
miracle has actually occurred, the falsity of the testimony must be more unlikely 
than the occurrence of the event itself. As Hume puts it, “no testimony is sufﬁcient 
to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood 
would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish” (EHU 
10.13; SBN 115–16). Note that this is an outcome rather than an assumption of 
Hume’s analysis. Imagine a case, says Hume (EHU 10.37; SBN 128), where it is 
reported that Queen Elizabeth is dead, but then a month later she is found alive 
and resumes the throne. It would be much more likely that some misperception or 
deception had occurred than that Elizabeth had risen from the dead, even if the 
falsehood of the testimony to her death is unlikely because it would require a huge 
conspiracy. The whole history of humanity agrees that there is no cure for death. 
Moreover, there is good reason to think that it is not only possible but even fairly 
common for people to be misled or to mislead with regard to this kind of claim: 
“the knavery and folly of men are such common phaenomena, that I should rather 
believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit 
of so signal a violation of the laws of nature” (EHU 10.37; SBN 128).
All of this said, Hume would still grant the possibility that in some particular 
case an ancient witness had accurately reported the actual occurrence of a miracle 
and that the chain of transmission from them to us happened to be entirely 
uncorrupted. Hume can accommodate this because he is really arguing against 
believing in miracles rather than against the possibility of miracles occurring. 
Hume’s argument depends on the fact that in any given instance it cannot be 
known in advance that the testimony was good (that the event was accurately 
described and the transmission of the report uncorrupted). Whether or not the 
testimony is good is precisely what needs to be judged, and Hume says we judge it 
on the basis of the available evidence and our background knowledge, including 
our knowledge of the vagaries of human psychology and our common experience 
with other instances of testimony.
The idea that a miracle report is credible only when it would be more improb-
able for the testimony to be false than it would be for the law to be violated is 
something Hume calls a “general maxim.” A maxim is neither a necessary prin-
ciple nor a certain truth, but rather a methodological rule to be followed in the 
absence of an adequate reason to think that it does not apply. Here, the maxim is 
a rule for reasoning about conﬂicting evidence claims: Barring adequate reasons 
to trust some particular testimony to a purported miracle, one should withhold 
assent from purported miracles.
This maxim has a second part: A miracle is credible just in case the falsehood 
of the testimony is more improbable than the event it describes, and “even in 
that case, there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives 
us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting 
Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005
 Miracles and Evidential Probability 45
the inferior” (EHU 10.13; SBN 116). Hume’s point here is that if one judges that 
the falsehood of the testimony is more unlikely than the falsehood of the event, 
even in that case one must still compare the probabilities on each side. The extent 
to which the falsehood of the testimony is probable is to be “deducted” from the 
probability that there was a law violation. The difference is the degree of assent 
to be attached to the miracle; since the probability of the non-violation of a law is 
extremely high, the probability of the truth of the testimony will have to be very 
high as well (in fact slightly higher), and the difference between the two, which 
establishes the degree of probability we should attach to the miracle’s occurrence, 
will thus be very small. (Consider the analogous case of a criminal trial in which 
there is one highly reliable witness against three agreeing but individually less 
reliable witnesses. The jury must weigh the probabilities to come to a decision. 
The decision’s degree of certainty will not be very high, because the competing 
testimonies partly cancel each other out.)
Earman calls this second part of the maxim Hume’s “diminution principle,” 
and it comes in for serious criticism on Bayesian grounds. In fact, the second part 
of Hume’s maxim regarding miracles has long been a cause of concern, because 
it seems that Hume is double counting (cf. Earman, 43). The degree to which 
one should believe that the next roll of a die will come up six is not calculated by 
subtracting the probability that the event will not occur from the probability that 
it will occur: 5/6 – 1/6 = 4/6 against, or 2/6 in favor. Clearly the correct degree of 
belief is 1/6 in favor. Coleman offers a resolution of this sort of apparent difﬁculty. 
In effect, she argues that this simple mathematical example and Earman’s more 
complex Bayesian ones are not appropriately analogous to Hume’s reasoning about 
evidential probability. I say more below about the principles behind Coleman’s 
defense of Hume’s diminution principle. But ﬁrst I turn to some of Earman’s other 
mischaracterizations of Hume.
3. Earman’s Misreadings of Hume
One of Earman’s themes (see especially 9–26 and 29–32) is that Hume’s theory 
of induction is flawed and is a source of error in Hume’s argument against 
miracles. It is true that Hume’s argument depends on his theory of the induc-
tive generation of universal empirical beliefs. And Hume’s theory of induction 
is admittedly imperfect—it is, if nothing else, based on an untenable theory of 
ideas. Nevertheless, I contend that Earman’s attack on Hume fails, and that it 
fails because he misunderstands key elements of Hume’s epistemology. There 
may well be problems with Hume’s argument against miracles, but they are not 
the ones Earman identiﬁes.
Earman claims that Hume’s argument is an example of the kind of over-reaching 
that gives philosophy a bad name (Earman, 3). He compares Hume’s maxim against 
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belief in miracles to the Logical Positivists’ “demarcation criterion” for distinguish-
ing science from pseudo-science. The history of attempts to devise demarcation 
criteria is a history of failure too extensive to survey here. Sufﬁce it to say that today 
philosophers of science agree that the best way to validate knowledge claims is on 
a case-by-case basis, rather than by trying to impose a single universal standard; 
Earman (3–4) concurs.
If Hume’s maxim regarding miracles were a demarcation criterion, Earman 
would be right to be suspicious of it. But interpreting Hume’s maxim as a demarca-
tion criterion is a mistake. Earman supposes that Hume is offering an argument 
against the possibility of miracles: Earman takes it that for Hume the probability 
that a miracle has occurred is “ﬂatly zero” (Earman, 13 and 23, et passim). In the 
framework of mathematical probability that Earman employs as the basis for his 
critique, Pr(p) = 0 means that p is a logically false proposition—and, thus, not-p 
is logically necessary. Above I mentioned that it is a mistake to read Hume as as-
serting that the non-occurrence of miracles is logically necessary: whether or not 
a miracle has occurred is a question regarding matters of fact. An even stronger 
reason to think that Earman is mistaken on this point is that the whole structure 
of Hume’s argument against miracles is a posteriori (and hence cannot arrive at 
logically necessary propositions). Hume argues that as a matter of fact, and given 
what we know about human psychology and the facts of history—especially what 
we know about bogus miracle claims, the credulity of religious believers, and how 
humans come to know laws of nature—there has never been and very probably 
never will be an instance in which the probability that a miracle has occurred is 
greater than the probability that the reporter is mistaken, has been deceived or 
is a deceiver.
Hume’s argument against miracles does not depend on, nor does it result in, 
a demarcation criterion. Rather, Hume is making a general a posteriori judgment 
about the facts of experience that are relevant to speciﬁc judgments about pur-
ported singular occurrences. These facts are so well-established that we need not 
perform a detailed analysis in every case. This is consistent with common sense 
and good epistemic practice.17 Given this, a great many of Earman’s criticisms are 
moot, based as they are on thinking that for Hume the probability that a miracle 
has actually occurred is always ﬂatly zero.
It is true that Hume did less than he might have done to establish that every 
case of a miracle report involves mistakes or deceptions, but it is enough for Hume’s 
purposes that reasonable people will be able to furnish particular evidence from 
their own experiences to make the general claim plausible for themselves. In the 
same way that no reasonable person today puts enough stock in claims about UFOs 
to demand an extremely detailed assessment of the evidence in every individual 
case, reports of miracles can be dismissed without detailed individual analyses. It 
is a moral certainty, given what we know, that these types of events do not occur. 
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This kind of judgment could be mistaken—moral certainty is not certainty, after 
all—but the burden of proof is on those who wish to establish that a miracle (or 
even a marvel) has occurred. Given the nature and extent of the evidence for the 
laws of nature, this is a heavy burden indeed.
Earman misses Hume’s drift, too, when he gives a long discussion of results 
in Bayesian probability theory to show that testimony or other evidence could 
potentially supply warrant adequate for rational belief in the occurrence of a 
miracle. Earman relies here on assumptions Hume would grant hypothetically 
but would utterly reject in the analysis of actual cases. For example, Earman’s 
proof that the testimony of multiple witnesses could raise the probability of the 
occurrence of a miracle above the threshold for reasonable belief (Earman, 53–9) 
depends on the assumption that all the witnesses are honest and have correctly 
perceived the event in question! It is possible, Hume would say, that this condi-
tion is sometimes satisﬁed. But given our background knowledge it is a practical 
certainty that we will never have adequate grounds to believe that this condition 
is satisﬁed in any particular case.
Earman’s attack on Hume depends on taking the threshold for reasonable 
belief in some proposition to be that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that 
it is true (Earman, 41, et passim). Since Hume speaks constantly of probabilities 
but never in numerical terms, it is difﬁcult to say what Hume would take as the 
numerical threshold reasonable belief. As discussed below, this is something Hume 
likely would not be willing to specify at all. But of one thing I am quite sure, namely, 
that the threshold for reasonable belief would depend on the knowledge claim in 
question: the more extraordinary the claim, the more extraordinary the evidence 
required to make believing it reasonable. And even ordinary beliefs Hume would 
not think of as adequately warranted if there were a 49 percent chance of them 
being false. This is in the range where a good skeptic should suspend judgment, 
since both the assertion and its denial are nearly equally likely.
Earman attributes the naïve “straight rule” of induction to Hume: “If n As 
have been examined, all of which are found to be Bs, then if n is sufﬁciently large, 
the probability that all As are Bs is 1” (Earman, 23). The textual evidence Earman 
cites to support the claim that Hume advocates the straight rule of induction is 
slight at best—he quotes four passages from the Enquiry,18 none of which imply 
the straight rule when Hume’s epistemology is properly understood.
The text Earman cites that most strongly suggests the straight rule is this: “[I]t 
seems evident, that, when we transfer the past to the future, in order to determine 
the effect, which will result from any cause, we transfer all the different events, in 
the same proportion as they have appeared in the past” (EHU 6.4; SBN 58; quoted 
in Earman, 81). But what Hume means by this is just that, through the habits of 
thought involved in constructing laws, we form an expectation that the proportion 
of future effects resulting from present causes will resemble the proportion of those 
Hume Studies
48 William L. Vanderburgh
effects that followed similar causes in the past. The strength of this expectation 
depends on our past experience: the more extensive and the more regular it is, the 
stronger the belief that the resemblance between past and future events will hold 
up. But even in the case of a very extensive and perfectly exceptionless regularity 
in past experience, Hume does not think the probability is 1 that the future will 
resemble the past. He admits, for example, that it is possible that the sun will not 
rise tomorrow (EHU 4.2; SBN 25–6), and that bread will not be nourishing the next 
time we eat it (EHU 4.16; SBN 34). For Hume no amount of past experience could 
make it that “the probability that all As are Bs is 1.”19
The mistaken view that Hume adopts the straight rule leads Earman (23) to 
claim that 
Hume is saying that when experience is uniform—when sufﬁciently many 
As have been examined and all have been found to be Bs—then we have a 
“proof” that all As are Bs. . . . Proofs are deﬁned as “such arguments from 
experience that leave no room for doubt or opposition.” In the probabi-
listic language I will adopt . . . this seems to imply that when experience 
provides a proof, the conditional probability of the conclusion, given the 
evidence of experience, is 1.
This gets Hume wrong in a fundamental sense: matters of fact can never be certain; 
moreover, since induction is fallible, Hume would never have intended to suggest 
that even a very large number of uniform observations produces a probability of 
1. This is true even for the exceptionless regularities upon which laws are founded. 
When Hume says “no room for doubt” here, he means that we have a strong 
psychological tendency to expect that the contrary will not occur. There are no 
grounds for doubt (an epistemic claim), but this is not the same as saying that the 
contrary is impossible (a logical claim).
Earman’s misinterpretation of Hume on this point leads to other problems. 
One example is Earman’s summary of the structure of Hume’s argument regard-
ing miracles:
So here in a nutshell is Hume’s ﬁrst argument against miracles. A (Hume) 
miracle is a violation of a presumptive law of nature. By Hume’s straight 
rule of induction, experience confers a probability of 1 on a presumptive 
law. Hence, the probability of a miracle is ﬂatly zero. Very simple. And 
very crude. (Earman, 23)
This is indeed simple and crude. And that is a good reason, I take it, for thinking 
that someone of Hume’s acumen and sophistication would offer no such argu-
ment. In large measure, it seems to me, Earman’s mischaracterizations of Hume 
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are based on not understanding that “proof” is for Hume a probabilistic category. 
There are also some deep differences between Hume and Earman on the nature of 
probability itself, to which I now turn.
4. Coleman: Hume as Non-Pascalian.
Dorothy Coleman20 defends Hume’s diminution principle, the idea that even in 
the case of reliable testimony regarding a miracle, when the testimony is compared 
to the experience of an otherwise exceptionless law of nature, there is “a mutual 
destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to 
that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior” (EHU 10.13; SBN 
116). While conceding that the diminution principle is inconsistent with math-
ematical probability theory (as Earman, 49–53, shows), Coleman argues that Hume 
can evade Earman’s critique because Hume’s theory of evidential probability has 
an entirely different structure and basis than that of mathematical probability. 
Following L. Jonathan Cohen,21 Coleman categorizes Hume as a “Baconian” rather 
than a “Pascalian” about evidential probability:
[W]hat all conceptions of probability have in common is that they pro-
vide different criteria for grading degrees of provability, and that degrees 
of provability allow for two kinds of scales. Pascalian scales take the lower 
extreme of probability to be disprovability or logical impossibility; the 
Baconian scale takes the lower extreme to be only non-provability or 
lack of proof.22
This understanding of Hume is certainly consistent with his remarks on evidential 
probability. Often, Hume is concerned with probability when he is evaluating 
the bases for various empirical beliefs; in those contexts a scale running from 
“not proved” through “proved” is exactly what is needed, especially for a skeptic 
like Hume.
The mathematical theory of probability originated with Blaise Pascal, who 
in 1654 exchanged a series of letters with Fermat addressing the question, “If one 
agrees to throw a certain number on a die in a given number of throws, does one 
have the advantage?” Cohen claims that “We must apparently look to David 
Hume . . . for the ﬁrst explicit recognition by one of Bacon’s admirers that there is 
an important kind of probability which does not ﬁt into the framework afforded 
by the calculus of chance.”23 He argues that there is “a long line of philosophical 
or methodological reﬂections about such a probability, stretching at least from 
the seventeenth into the nineteenth century.”24 This approach is present, for 
example, in the philosophies of science of J. S. Mill and J. W. Herschel, and in the 
legal theory of James Glassford, a nineteenth century Scot.
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Cohen’s basic claim seems right, but there is something odd about the details. 
Hume was, after all, largely echoing Locke’s view of probability, so Hume is not the 
ﬁrst writer after Bacon to hold that theory of probability. And if Hume was the ﬁrst 
to explicitly distinguish the two conceptions of probability, he did so in a way that 
has been missed by most of his readers. In fact, as I show below, the “Baconian” 
approach to probability predates Bacon by centuries.
Coleman’s defense of Hume’s diminution principle is a good one unless 
there are deﬁnitive arguments against the non-Pascalian conception of degrees 
of proof. This is an issue I cannot conclusively resolve here, but I claim that the 
non-Pascalian approach is at the very least plausible for the kinds of cases Hume 
is considering. In what follows I support this claim in two ways. In section 5, I 
show that Hume’s approach is consistent with a long tradition of thinking about 
evidential probability, a tradition that is plausible in its own right. In section 6, I 
argue that the non-Pascalian approach is not ruled out by the “Dutch book” argu-
ment, which various authors use to show that one must reason about probability 
in Pascalian terms.
5. The History of the Non-Pascalian Approach to Evidential 
Probability.
Franklin discusses evidential probability from its roots in ancient Greek and espe-
cially Roman thought, through the medieval period and up to the seventeenth 
century. Franklin begins with a standard distinction between two categories of 
probability. The ﬁrst is “factual,” “stochastic,” or “aleatory” probability; it has to 
do with chance set-ups (such as rolling dice) that produce characteristic random 
sequences. The second is “logical,” “epistemic,” or “evidential” probability, the 
theory of the relation of partial support between propositions (a.k.a. non-deductive 
logic).25 Franklin shows that the two kinds of probability have been treated separately 
throughout almost the whole of the history of thought. Moreover,
while the probability of outcomes with dice throws is essentially nu-
merical, and advances in understanding are measured by the ability to 
calculate the right answers, it is otherwise with logical probability. Even 
now, the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses in law or science 
is not usually quantiﬁed, and it is debated whether it is quantiﬁable even 
in principle. (Franklin, xi)
Bayesianism assumes that both factual and epistemic probabilities are to be 
treated in the same way: numerically. Earman’s attack therefore turns, in effect, 
on accusing Hume of not treating the evidence for miracles in the same terms as 
dice throws are treated. Given that the debate over the nature of probability is not 
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settled, and that history sides with Hume in treating factual and epistemic prob-
abilities differently, Earman’s contention that “Of Miracles” is an abject failure is 
clearly far too strong.
Ancient and medieval thinking about probability is mostly in the context of 
the law where, naturally, there is a concern about what kinds of evidence establish 
what kinds of facts with what degree of assurance. The Talmud and Roman law are 
similar with respect to rules of proof, especially on the question of witnesses and 
in the fact that a high standard of proof is required. This latter point is related to 
the fact that it is morally worse to convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty. 
Because of this, in turn, “The fundamental rule in Roman law, and since, [is] that 
‘proof is incumbent on the party who afﬁrms a fact, not on him who denies it’” 
(Franklin, 7, quoting the Roman Corpus of Civil Law).
Members of the ﬁrst generation of medieval commentators on the Digest of an-
cient Roman law (re-discovered in Pavia about 1050 C.E.) are known as “Glossators”; 
modern law descends from the Glossators in an unbroken tradition (Franklin, 16). 
The Glossators initiated the development of thinking in terms of (non-numerical) 
grades of probability when they invented the concept of “half proof.” In ancient 
and medieval law, two witnesses or a notarized document were normally required 
for “full proof,” that is, proof sufﬁcient for conviction. The Glossators’ innovation 
was to come up with a way to deal with the fact that a single witness, or a private 
document, is not entirely worthless even though it is still less than full proof. The 
Glossators proposed that two half proofs added together would be sufﬁcient for 
conviction although one alone would not be. Franklin (12) writes,
The resulting theory is a coherent one. It is not numerical, and there is 
no reason to think it would have been improved if it had been numerical. 
On the contrary, since modern (English) law has a similar theory, and 
insists on keeping it non-numerical, there is every reason to believe the 
medievals were correct in avoiding numbers.26
According to Franklin, during the Renaissance there was almost no develop-
ment in legal theory, but there was widespread familiarity with medieval concepts 
of evidence and probability, including non-numerical grades of proof. These 
concepts were promulgated by two standard texts on legal evidence, by Menochio 
and Mascardi respectively.27 Menochio held that innovations in law, particularly 
attempts to invent new kinds of evidence, are generally a sign of fraud (Franklin, 
45). It is worth noting that the treatment of presumptions in Scots law is based on 
Menochio (Franklin, 44): Hume was no doubt familiar with this, and it would be 
a short step to the position that claims about violations of laws of nature are also 
likely to be frauds, even independent of the fact that fraud is known to be common 
with regard to purported miracles. At the very least, Hume’s treatment of miracles 
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is consistent with a long and careful tradition regarding evidential probability, one 
still current in Hume’s time. If that tradition is incorrect, it is certainly misguided 
to lay the blame at Hume’s feet.
Whatever we should say about its direct inﬂuence on Hume speciﬁcally, it is 
true that legal theory had a huge impact on thinking about evidential probabil-
ity generally. Franklin (350) points out that in the medieval and early modern 
periods, the law was 
a model for reasoning in all those areas [including medicine, philosophy, 
business, politics, and so on] in which there is necessarily a balancing of 
opinions. This helps explain why the originators of mathematical prob-
ability were all either professional lawyers (Fermat, Huygens, de Witt, 
Leibniz) or at least the sons of lawyers (Cardano, Pascal).
And, since Bacon was a lawyer, the fact that his account of evidential probability 
in science mirrors the treatment of evidence in the law is no surprise once the con-
nections have been laid out. Note that even today legal concepts such as “proof 
beyond reasonable doubt” (ﬁrst appearing in English law around 1770) are not 
treated numerically (Franklin 366).28
6. Hume and the Bayesians.
This much shows that Hume’s non-mathematical approach to evidential probability 
is consistent with a long and laudable tradition. But history aside, Hume’s approach 
to evidential probability may even be correct. Certainly, the non-mathematical 
approach is still commonly agreed to be appropriate in many kinds of situations. 
As Franklin (131) emphasizes, it is very unusual in law, science, and ordinary life to 
treat probability numerically: “The big bang theory of the universe is much more 
probable, on present evidence, than the steady-state theory. But it is a rare scientist 
who can be found to say exactly how much more probable—or even approximately 
how much.” Part of Franklin’s thesis is that the historical scarcity of numerical treat-
ments of probability is not a sign of the underdevelopment of probability theory 
before Pascal, nor even a sign of the difﬁculty of applying numerical probability in 
practical situations. Rather, it is due to the fact that in many situations the numeri-
cal approach is simply inappropriate.
Bayesians often appeal to the Dutch book argument to establish that their 
approach to probability is the only correct one. The Dutch book argument shows 
that someone whose reasoning about probabilities is not in conformity with the 
axioms of mathematical probability is susceptible to willingly accepting a “Dutch 
book”—that is, a ﬁnite series of bets each of which the bettor takes to be fair but 
over the course of which the bettor is guaranteed to lose money, no matter what 
Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005
 Miracles and Evidential Probability 53
the outcomes. Since Bayes’s Rule for updating degree of belief in light of new 
evidence is a simple consequence of the axioms of mathematical probability, the 
Dutch book argument is taken to imply that it is necessary to be a Bayesian about 
evidential probability. Bayesians often put the point by saying that Bayes’s Rule 
is a condition for rationality.29
A Bayesian might hope to ﬁnd here a demonstration that the non-Pascalian 
approach is doomed to failure. But the Dutch book argument assumes the Pascalian 
scale of probability, it does not prove it. Without the assumption that degrees of 
belief are numerical and run on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, the basic arithmetic 
of the Dutch book argument would be impossible. So, what the Dutch book argu-
ment actually shows is merely that if there are numerical degrees of belief ranging 
continuously from 0 to 1, then one must, on pain of incoherence, reason about 
degree of belief in conformity with the axioms of mathematical probability (and 
hence with Bayes’s Rule). A hypothetical proposition of that sort, even if true, does 
not prove that one must be a Pascalian in the ﬁrst place.
Earman (25) chastises Hume for being unaware of Bayesianism and of math-
ematical probability generally. This is unfair on two counts. First, Bayes’s work on 
probability was not widely known in 1748 when Hume published the ﬁrst edition 
of the Enquiry. Richard Price arranged the posthumous publication of Bayes’s es-
say only in 1763, and it remained obscure even after its publication; Price’s paper 
applying Bayesian methods to the evidence for miracles appeared in 1767.30 We 
know Hume read and admired that paper,31 but he neither addressed Bayesian ar-
guments nor revised his account of miracles for the 1768 and 1777 editions of the 
Enquiry. This suggests that Hume ultimately did not view Bayes’s work as relevant 
to the argument against miracles. Second, Hume’s discussion of the probability 
of chances (see for example THN 1.3.11 and 1.3.12; SBN 124–42, and EHU 6; SBN 
56–9) “shows without controversy that he was familiar with the basic concepts 
of probability based on the calculus of chances.”32 Given Hume’s familiarity with 
Pascalian probability in general, and his acquaintance (through Price) with Bayes-
ian ideas, his non-numerical treatment of the evidential probability of miracles 
must be seen as a deliberate philosophical position, not as a result of negligence 
or ignorance.
Is there anything wrong with Bayesian analyses of evidential probability? 
One problem can be teased out this way. Bayes and Price (and, by extension, other 
Bayesians such as Earman) are forced to make assumptions about the distribution 
of chances across contrary possible outcomes, assumptions which are rarely if ever 
justiﬁed outside of highly constrained and artiﬁcial experimental situations. Bayes, 
for example, develops his argument in terms of the equal chances of a perfectly 
round ball coming to rest at any given place on a perfectly ﬂat table. His conclu-
sions do indeed follow for such idealized cases. But, to speak metaphorically, we 
usually do not have round balls and ﬂat tables, or at least we cannot be sure that 
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we do. The assumption of the equipossibility of contrary outcomes is therefore 
usually not justiﬁed in actual cases. Barry Gower writes, “Hume had, in effect, 
noticed the role of an assumption of this kind in any attempt to counter inductive 
skepticism when he pointed out that ‘if there be any suspicion that the course of 
nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience 
becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.’”33 It may be 
that, methodologically speaking, when assessing probabilities numerically there 
is no better principle to apply than the principle of indifference (which says that 
contrary possibilities are to be treated as equally probable in the absence of any 
reason to think otherwise), but that does not mean that it is a good principle to 
apply in assessing the evidential probability of empirical hypotheses in the sense 
that it reliably leads to correct conclusions in all types of cases.
Is it sensible to treat all probabilities numerically? Franklin (327) notes that
Factual probability is essentially numerical, certainly. . . . But Keynes, 
in his classic Treatise of Probability, argued at length that not all logical 
probabilities should have numbers. Even if they do have numbers in 
principle, no convincing way has been discovered of actually assigning 
a number to, for example, the probability of the steady-state theory of 
the universe on present evidence—or even such a simple case as the prob-
ability that the next ball chosen from an urn will be black, given that 
all of the twenty balls already chosen have been black. . . . This should 
caution us against supposing that, because the concept of probability 
before Pascal was mostly nonnumerical, it was therefore primitive or in 
some way inadequate.
Having a non-numerical theory of evidential probability does not mean that 
we must give up all hope of precision and rigor in our assessments of the probabil-
ity of empirical hypotheses. There are other ways to achieve this: In discussions 
of temperature, for example, classiﬁcatory concepts (hot, warm, very cold, etc.) 
and comparative concepts (hotter than, etc.) are possible without any numerical 
scale. Similarly the non-numerical tradition of evidential probability has given 
us perfectly serviceable classiﬁcatory concepts (improbable, probable, highly 
probable) and comparative concepts (more probable than, etc.). (See Franklin 
328.) If this seems insufﬁcient, we should ask whether quantitative theories of 
probability can really do better: “Has the quantiﬁcation of probability helped 
in the evaluation of uncertain evidence in science?” Franklin (369) answers, “In 
the restricted cases in which statistical tests apply, it has, but for more general 
theory evaluation, it seems not.” The desire for increased precision is laudable 
but, as the quotation from Aristotle at the head of this article points out, it can 
be taken too far.
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There have been several attempts over the years to analyze Hume’s argument 
against miracles in Bayesian terms.34 Interestingly, about as many claim to sup-
port Hume’s conclusion as claim to refute it; the fact that contradictory results 
have been achieved is possibly a symptom of the wrong-headedness of Bayesian 
reconstructions of Hume’s argument against miracles.35 The fact that there are so 
many incompatible Bayesian accounts of miracles also suggests that the correct 
Bayesian account is even now neither clear nor settled—yet another reason not to 
blame Hume for giving a non-Bayesian analysis. Given the diversity of Bayesian 
opinions, it is perhaps no surprise that some of them are consistent with what 
Hume says about miracles. (In the present context I hesitate to calculate the prob-
ability of such a coincidence.)
Barry Gower thinks that the
“Bayesian” interpretation of the argument against miracles misrepresents 
Hume’s reasoning. . . . [T]he error needs to be rectiﬁed, not just because it 
involves a mistaken view about the past but, more importantly, because 
it obscures the legacy of a different mode of thinking evident in Hume’s 
writing about probabilistic inference which deserves to be recovered. 
Our thinking is impoverished if certain presumptions about probability 
become so entrenched that we have great difﬁculty in seeing them as 
anything other than obvious.36
The “different mode of thinking” Gower has in mind is a mathematical (but 
non-Bayesian) approach to evidential probability found in Jakob Bernoulli’s (1713) 
Ars Conjectandi.37 Gower suggests that Hume’s argument against miracles is an ap-
plication of Bernoulli’s approach. I agree with almost every point in the quotation 
above, but I see two difﬁculties with the Bernoullian hypothesis. First, a Bayesian 
could respond that belief coherence demands that mathematical probabilities 
conform to the probability calculus: if Bernoulli-style reasoning leads to a conclu-
sion different from that produced by Bayes’s Rule, it can be rejected. That would 
imply that either Hume’s argument must be equivalent to the Bayesian assessment 
of the probability arising from the testimony for miracles or it must be wrong—a 
conclusion we should not be too quick to embrace. The second difﬁculty is that the 
Bernoullian analysis already assumes that evidential probabilities are numerical. If 
we deny this, as I think Hume would, then we also avoid the ﬁrst difﬁculty. Rather 
than looking to Bernoulli in order to understand Hume’s theory of evidential prob-
ability, we should look to the medieval legal tradition—a tradition whose mutual 
inﬂuence on Pascal, Bernoulli, and other developers of mathematical probability 
explains the similarity between their approaches and Hume’s.
In other respects Gower’s position is very similar to the one advocated here. He 
thinks, for example, that “Hume’s probabilities are not structured in accordance 
Hume Studies
56 William L. Vanderburgh
with any conventional theory of chances where they are represented by frac-
tional numbers between zero and one.”38 He notes, too, that Hume’s probabilities 
are non-additive, and remarks that “Hume’s training as a lawyer may well have 
inﬂuenced his attitude to probabilistic reasoning, and it is recognized that legal 
probabilities” do not conform to the axioms of the probability calculus.39 Gower 
gets things exactly right when he writes that Hume
quite evidently evaluates probable arguments in a way that cannot be 
reconciled with the pre-suppositions of Bayes’s theorem. For example, 
an argument [with no] probability is, for Hume, one where favourable 
cases equal the unfavourable cases; and an argument where there were 
only favourable, or unfavourable, cases, would not be a probable argu-
ment at all [but a proof in Hume’s sense]. We think that an event with a 
small probability is unlikely to occur; Hume thought that such an event 
is more likely to occur than not.40
7. Conclusion
Let me conclude by commenting on one ﬁnal passage from Earman (25):
A number of Hume’s contemporaries, such as Price, understood Hume’s 
claims as being about quantiﬁable degrees of belief or credibility, the 
quantiﬁcation being subject to the constraints of the probability calculus. 
I have no doubt that Hume would have agreed to this much, and I have 
little doubt that . . . he would have agreed that the probabilistic form of 
analysis is wholly appropriate when discussing the credibility of testi-
mony. Naysayers will have a hard time explaining away [the letter from 
Hume to Price41], where Hume is implicitly accepting the probabilistic 
form into which Price cast Hume’s argument. 
I have argued here, following Coleman and Cohen and relying on Franklin’s 
history of evidential probability, that the propositions Earman has no doubt 
Hume would accept are ones Hume would in fact deny. As a “naysayer” I have 
an easy explanation of the letter to Price. Hume’s remarks are really rather 
non-committal: all he says is that Price’s argument is “new and plausible and 
ingenious, and perhaps solid” and that he needs more time to judge it. Hume 
was always cordial to critics who treated him cordially (see Coleman, 196–7): 
politeness is thus a sufﬁcient explanation of Hume’s letter to Price. It would be 
perfectly consistent for Hume to have judged that numbers are inappropriate in 
the assessment of evidential probabilities.
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My overall case here against Earman is twofold. First, that to whatever extent 
his critique of Hume’s argument against the credibility of miracles succeeds, it 
does so only by shifting the ground. Earman in effect attacks a straw Hume. His 
claim that Hume’s argument against miracles is an “abject” failure has therefore 
certainly not been proven; Earman’s arguments in fact do not establish that it is a 
failure at all. Second, in order to reach a deﬁnitive answer regarding whether or not 
Hume is correct, it would need to be decided whose starting assumptions—Hume’s 
non-Pascalian assumptions or Earman’s Pascalian ones—properly apply to the 
analysis of the evidence for miracles. This issue has not been decided here. But sev-
eral factors—the history of thinking about evidential probability, current normal 
practice in assessing the probability of empirical hypotheses, and a lack of proof 
of the necessity of the Pascalian approach—all coincide, and together strongly 
suggest that Hume’s non-Pascalian foundation, and his resulting analysis of the 
evidence for miracles, is plausible. The burden of proof is on Pascalians to justify 
the basic principles which Earman assumes in his attack on Hume. Only once that 
burden has been satisﬁed could a Pascalian go on to try to ascertain whether or 
not Hume’s actual position on miracles holds up.
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